Corruption in the Mexican Judicial Branch as a causal factor of the 2024 judicial reform

Abstract

The objective of this article is to demonstrate that the judicial reform implemented in Mexico in 2024 was the result of prevailing corruption within the Federal Judiciary and not political factors. The working hypothesis considers the corruption of the Federal Judiciary Council as the determining factor in the loss of confidence in the Mexican Judiciary and the reason for the promotion of comprehensive judicial reform in Mexico. Grounded theory was used to analyze the data, as it is a methodology that allows for open-minded discussion of under-discussed topics and, based on available information, the causal relationships presented to the observer. Realist legal theory was also used, which considers that the law must have practical application and utility. The study determined that corruption emanating from Mexico's Federal Judicial Council, which, based on its discretionary power to establish General Agreements, allowed the development of a culture of corruption that encouraged nepotism. In certain judicial districts in the country, this led to family ties between magistrates and judges and up to 82% of the employees.